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LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Kenneth M. Murchison*
During the 1980-81 term, the United States Supreme Court and
Louisiana's appellate courts rendered a number of significant deci-
sions in law suits involving local governments. In the federal deci-
sions, the Supreme Court restricted the applicability of the one-
person/one-vote concept to limited-function districts;' struck down,
on first amendment grounds, a zoning ordinance that attempted to
ban all live entertainment in a municipality and a billboard or-
dinance that prohibited most non-commercial advertising;2 applied
the pre-clearance requirements of the Voting Rights Act to a court-
ordered reapportionment;3  and upheld the validity of a
municipality's decision to close one end of a street in a residential
neighborhood even though a disproportionate number of the
motorists inconvenienced by the closing were black.' The reach of
the state decisions was even more diverse; they covered virtually
the entire gamut of state problems including the status of local
governments vis-a-vis the state,' election controversies,' annexation,7
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University
1. Ball v. James, 101 S. Ct. 1811 (1981); see notes 16-44, infra and accompanying
text.
2. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 101 S. Ct. 2176 (1981); Metromedia, Inc.
v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981).
3. McDaniel v. Sanchez, 448 U.S. 1318 (1981).
4. City of Memphis v. Green, 101 S. Ct. 1584 (1981). The fourteenth amendment
challenge to the closing of the street failed because the plaintiffs did not prove
discriminatory intent. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Without directly
considering the question of whether the discriminatory intent requirement applied to
actions based on the thirteenth amendment or 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976), the Court held
that the plaintiff's proof failed to establish a violation of either of those provisions.
5. Tull v. City of Baton Rouge, 385 So. 2d 343 (La. 1980); see notes 45-69. infra
and accompanying text.
6. Newman v. City of Baton Rouge, 392 So. 2d 100 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ
denied, 393 So. 2d 724 (La. 1980) (plaintiff not allowed to qualify for councilmanic elec-
tion when the area in which he lived was annexed into the city after the qualification
period for the office had expired); Wayne v. Green, 389 So. 2d 104 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
390 So. 2d 494 (La. 1980) (votes cast for a withdrawn candidate had to be counted in
determining if one of the two remaining candidates had achieved a majority in the first
primary).
7. Kel-Kan Inv. Corp. v. Village of Greenwood, 393 So. 2d 818 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1981) (petition alleging that municipal decision refusing to annex an area was
unreasonable stated a cause of action under Louisiana's annexation statute).
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public officers' and employees,9 the reach of the police power,"° land
use planning," special assessments, 2 public contracts," tort liabil-
8. Brown v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 2d 290 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980)
(the requirement that a plaintiff who sues public officials post bond is not applicable
when the suit is filed against the agency that employs the official); Perez v. Pla-
quemines Parish Comm'n Council, 391 So. 2d 1308 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980), writ
denied, 397 So. 2d 805 (La. 1981) (parish council had authority to investigate actions of
the parish district attorney with respect to property and equipment owned by the
parish and with respect to expenditures of criminal court funds but had no authority
to investigate the district attorney in connection with his impeachment or removal.
9. See, e.g., Timmons v. Municipal Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 395 So. 2d 1372
(La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 401 So. 2d 358 (La. 1981) (dismissal of a police officer
for drinking a non-alcoholic beverage in a lounge while on sick leave upheld as based
on a violation of a valid order of the police department); Callaghan v. New Orleans
Dep't of Fire, 385 So. 2d 25 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980) (dismissing a firefighter for
remarks relating to department policies and procedures as well as his own employee
evaluation held to violate his first amendment rights to freedom of speech); Picton v.
Sewerage & Water Bd., 385 So. 2d 1259 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 393 So. 2d 742
(La. 1980) (discharged employee may offer evidence to show that improper motive, not
the stated reason, was the motivation for discharge); White v. City of Winnfield Fire
Dep't, 384 So. 2d 471 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 392 So. 2d 663 (La. 1980) (state
law forbids a municipality from requiring that fire fighters live within city boundaries).
In a series of decisions, the fourth circuit has tried to define with precision when the
New Orleans Civil Service Board may reduce a dismissal to a suspension. Compare
Joseph v. Department of Health, 389 So. 2d 739 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980) (Civil Service
Commission had no authority to reduce a dismissal to a suspension where the appoint-
ing authority had evidence sufficient to constitute cause for dismissal) with Chandler
v. Department of Streets, 394 So. 2d 812 (La. App. 1st Cir.) writ denied, 385 So. 2d 274
(La. 1980) (Civil Service Commission's reductions of dismissals to suspensions upheld
because the Commission had sufficient evidence to decide that the appointing authority
lacked sufficient cause for dismissal).
10. See, e.g., Scott v. Dumas, 396 So. 2d 378 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 399
So. 2d 611 (La.), appeal dismissed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3300 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 20, 1981) (city had
authority to change the name of a street regardless of the motive that induced council
members to vote for the name change); City of Lafayette v. Butcher Air Conditioning,
Co., 392 So. 2d 757 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980) (ordinance requiring contractors to furnish
ladders for city inspectors to use when inspecting air conditioning units upheld).
11. Tiber Petroleum, Inc. v. Parish of Jefferson, 391 So. 2d 1178 (La. 1980); Kirk v.
Town of Westlake, 387 So. 2d 1157 (La. 1980); Baehr v. City of Lake Charles, 387 So.
2d 1160 (La. 1980). See notes 70-85, infra and accompanying text. See also Lanford v.
Calcasieu Parish Police Jury, 396 So. 2d 956 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981) (nonconforming use
status granted only as to that part of a mobile home park actually being used on the
effective date of the parish zoning ordinance); Lambert v. Parish of Jefferson, 390 So.
2d 515 (La. 1980) (thirty day prescriptive period in state's zoning enabling statute does
not apply to a parish zoning ordinance).
12. Toomer v. City of Lake Charles, 392 So. 2d 794 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980), writ
denied, 396 So. 2d 931 (La. 1981) (reinscription of paving assessment lien does not pre-
vent the underlying claim from prescribing).
13. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Morial, 397 So. 2d 1361 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1980) (a judgment declaring that a contract which provided for administrative services
with respect to the city's health care plan had to be let by public bidding was
affirmed); Freeman v. Town of Many, 394 So. 2d 693 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
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ity," and citizen access to the meetings of public bodies. 5
Holding the present discussion within manageable bounds re-
quired considerable selectivity. To permit a thorough analysis of the
areas chosen for comment, this article confines its discussion to four
areas: the one-person/one-vote principle, the status of local govern-
ments vis-A-vis the state, the zoning authority of local governments,
and the tort liability of local governments.
FEDERAL VOTING RIGHTS
In the years after Reynolds v. Sims"' established the one-
person/one-vote principle for elections of state legislators, various
Supreme Court decisions extended the principle to cover local elec-
tions where the persons elected controlled entities that excercised
general governmental powers. Thus, Avery v. Midland County"7 ap-
plied the Reynolds rule to elections of the officials of a county
government; Kramer v. Union Free School District,8 to elections of
399 So. 2d 598 (La. 1981) (contract between town and contractor for construction of
sewerage line contained stipulation pour autrui in favor of affected property owners);
American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. Pavia-Byrne Eng'r Corp., 393 So. 2d 830 (La. App.
2d Cir.), writ denied, 397 So. 2d 1362 (La. 1981) (a city is not liable to a surety for in-
adequate retainage when payments were made in good faith reliance on the engineer's
certificate, but the engineer is liable for his negligence in certifying the amount of
work completed).
14. Several decisions tried to clarify when the state and parish are liable for torts
committed by constitutional officers who serve individual parishes. Hyrhorchuk v.
Smith, 390 So. 2d 497 (La. 1980); Mullins v. State, 387 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980); Car-
mouche v. Oubre, 394 So. 2d 805 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981); Rodrigue v. Breaux, 388 So.
2d 60 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); Michaelman v. Amiss, 385 So. 2d 404 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
writ denied, 397 So. 2d 1362 (La. 1980); see notes 86-106, infra and accompanying text.
Other significant decisions attempted to clarify the standards of strict liability under
article 2317. Shipp v. City of Alexandria, 395 So. 2d 727 (La. 1981); Jones v. City of
Baton Rouge, 388 So. 2d 737 (La. 1980); Smith v. Town of Logansport, 395 So. 2d 888
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1981); Sablier v. City of Baton Rouge, 393 So. 2d 148 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1980; Baggett v. City of Bogalusa, 391 So. 2d 1210 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); Wall v.
Village of Tallulah, 385 So. 2d 905 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980), writ denied, 393 So. 2d 737
(La. 1980); see notes 107-30, infra and accompanying text. Finally, one other important
decision imposed liability on a local government for injuries resulting from the
negligent inspection of a building under construction. Stewart v. Schmieder, 386 So. 2d
1351 (La. 1980); see notes 131-45, infra and accompanying text.
15. Eastwold v. Garsaud, 387 So. 2d 682 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 393 So.
2d 746 (La. 1980) (New Orleans Civil Service Commission not subject to open meetings
law in existence prior to 1979 amendments). In a decision rendered after this article
was prepared, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed a decision of the first circuit and
held that the Louisiana High School Athletic Association was a public body within the
meaning of the open meetings law. Spain v. Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n, 398
So. 2d 1386 (La. 1981).
16. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
17. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
18. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
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local school board members; and Hadley v. Junior College District,'
to elections of the trustees of a community college district. The
Supreme Court judged all of these attempts to restrict the franchise
by a "compelling state interest" rationale;" and none of the deci-
sions found the state interest sufficient to justify a restriction of the
franchise.
The only decision in which the Supreme Court upheld a restric-
tive franchise for elections of the officials who controlled a local
governmental entity was Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin
Water Storage District." The water district involved in Salyer en-
compassed 193,000 acres; but only seventy-seven persons lived in
the area and four corporations collectively owned 85 percent of the
acreage. The only functions in which the district was engaged in-
volved acquisition, storage, conservation, and distribution of water
for farming in the basin; state law also permitted water districts to
generate and sell power, but the Tulare Lake Basin District had
never exercised this power. The operating costs of the water
district were assessed against each landowner according to the
water benefits the landowner received, and the directors of the
district were elected by landowners under a system where voting
power was apportioned according to the assessed valuation of the
landowners' property.
The Supreme Court gave two reasons for distinguishing Salyer
from earlier decisions holding the one-person/one-vote principle
applicable to local elections. For one thing, the governmental
authority exercised by the water district was "relatively limited."'
In addition, the land owners in the district were "disproportionately
affected" by the district's actions because the financial burdens of
those actions fell on the landowners in proportion to the benefits
they received from the district. 3 In light of these differences, the
Court abandoned the requirement that the restriction on the fran-
chise be justified by a compelling state interest. Instead, it simply
inquired whether the statutory voting scheme 'was a reasonable
means of achieving the objectives of the statute authorizing the
creation of water districts. The Salyer opinion answered this ques-
tion in the affirmative, reasoning that the legislature could
19. 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
20. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1970). See also Hill v.
Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 297 (1975); Phoenix v. Koldoziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (requiring
"some overriding interests of [property) owners that the state is entitled to
recognize").
21. 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
22. 1d. at 728.
23. Id. at 729.
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reasonably have concluded that landowners would not have agreed
to the special financial burdens necessary for the creation of the
district if they had not been given control over the selection of the
directors."4
The unique facts of Salyer-the small number of people living in
the area, the very narrow range of services provided by the district,
and the financing of operating expenses through annual assessments
of landowners-made it subject to an extremely narrow interpreta-
tion, but the recent decision of Ball v. James2" suggests that the
Supreme Court is unwilling to limit Salyer to its peculiar facts. Like
Salyer, Ball involved a water reclamation district that was founded
to acquire, conserve, store, and distribute water to farmers." The
modern activities of the two districts differed significantly, however.
The activities of the Tulare Lake Basin District had remained
limited to providing water for farming activities located in a sparse-
ly settled area, while the district involved in Ball distributed water
and furnished electricity in an area that contained almost half the
population of the state of Arizona and included large parts of
Phoenix and other cities.
24. Id. at 731.
25. 101 S. Ct. 1811 (1981). Mr. Justice Powell filed a brief concurring opinion em-
phasizing "the importance to [his) decision of the Arizona legislature's control over
voting requirements for the . .. idistrict." Id. at 1821. Because the district was "large
enough and the resources it manages (werel basic enough [to insure] that the people
will act through their elected legislature when further changes in the governance of
the District" are needed, he favored "allowling] the political process to operate." Id. at
1822.
Mr. Justice White submitted a dissenting opinion that Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun joined. Id. at 1822-30. Attacking "the strained logic that the provision of
water and electricity to several hundred thousand citizens is a 'peculiarly narrow func-
tion,'" id. at 1822, the dissenters identified six factors that indicated the Ball district
"exerciseldl substantial governmental powers": the status of the district as a
"municipal corporation . . . under the laws of Arizona"; the tax exempt status of the
district's bonds and property; the district's ability to acquire property by eminent do-
main; the power granted the district "to enter into a wide range of contractual
arrangements to secure energy sources"; the district's "authority to allocate water
within its service area"; and the exemption of the district's rate structure from control
by the Arizona Corporation Commission. Id. at 1824-25. In addition, Mr. Justice White
argued that the contrast between the two districts was "even more pronounced" when
one focused on the "relative impact" of the district's operations "on the favored land-
owner voters and those who may not vote." Id. at 1826. In Salyer, "the burdens of the
water district fell entirely on the landowners"; by contrast, the Ball district
"subsidize[d] the storage and delivery of irrigation water for agricultural purposes by
selling electricity . . . at prices that neither the voters nor any representative public
agency has any right to control." Id. at 1826-27. Thus, the dissenting opinion concluded
that treating "the effect of the District's operations in this case [as] substantially akin
to that in Salyer ignoreld] reality." Id. at 1827-28.
26. See ARIZ. R.S. §§ 45.-901 to -1047 (1956 & Supp. 1981). For a brief history of
the evolution of the Ball District to its present form, see 101 S. Ct. at 1813-15.
[Vol. 42
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The Supreme Court itself specifically acknowledged four distinc-
tions between the districts involved in Salyer and Ball; (1) the area
served in Salyer was sparsely settled and "entirely devoted to
agriculture," while the area served in Ball included several large
population centers; (2) unlike the Salyer district, the Ball water
district actually exercised its statutory authority to generate elec-
tricity and had "become one of the largest suppliers of such power
in the state"; (3) all of the water distributed by the Salyer district
went for agricultural uses while nearly 40 percent of the water
distributed by the Ball district was used for non-agricultural pur-
poses; and (4) "whereas all operating costs of the Tulare District
were born by the voting landowners through assessments apportioned
according to land value, most of the capital and operating costs of
the [Ball district] have been met through the revenues generated by
the selling of electric power."2
Notwithstanding these distinctions, the Supreme Court ruled
the Reynolds principle inapplicable to the elections of the directors
of the Ball district. The Court gave three reasons for its conclusion
that the distinctions between the two districts did "not amount to a
constitutional difference."" First, the Ball district had "not
exercise[d] the sort of governmental powers that invoke the strict
demands of Reynolds";" with respect to this point, the Court em-
phasized that the district did not impose property or sales taxes,
enact laws regulating the conduct of citizens, or administer such
"normal" governmental functions as maintaining streets, operating
schools, or providing sanitation, welfare, or health services. Second,
the district's water functions were "relatively narrow"; all of the
district's water-related functions involved conservation and delivery
of water that it did not own or sell, and all the water delivered by
the district was "distributed according to land ownership."3 Third,
"neither the existence nor [the] size of the district's power business
affect[ed] the legality of the property-based voting scheme . .
because "the electric power functions were stipulated to be incidental
to the water functions which [were] the district's primary purpose....""
Not only were the district's functions "of the narrow, special
sort which justifies a departure from the popular election require-
ment" of Reynolds, but-as in Salyer-the cost associated with pro-
viding the district's functions had a disproportionate impact on the
"specific class of people whom the system makes eligible to vote."32
27. 101 S. Ct. at 1818.
28. lId
29. lt
30. Id. at 1819.
31. 1d.
32. Id. at 1820.
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Only landowners had property subject to liens to secure the general
obligations bonds of the district, only landowners were subject to
the acreage-base taxing power of the district, and only landowners
had "ever committed capital to the District."3
Because it satisfied the two prongs of the Salyer test, the elec-
toral scheme challenged in Ball was judged by the relatively lenient
"reasonableness" standard. It satisfied that standard because, as the
parties themselves stipulated, "the subscriptions of land which made
the ... District possible might well have never occurred had not the
subscribing landowners been assured a special voice in the conduct
of the District's business."3'
Despite Ball, the exact reach of the Salyer exception to the
Reynolds principle remains unclear. Although both Salyer and Ball
involved water reclamation districts, one finds it difficult to suggest
any reason for confining the exception to such districts. To use the
Court's language, the exception should be applicable to any special
district where the governmental powers exercised are "relatively
narrow" and where "an aspect of [the district's] limited purpose is
the disproportionate relationship the District's functions bear to the
specific class of people whom the system makes eligible to vote."35
At first glance, the requirement that the powers exercised
must be "relatively narrow" seems a fairly lenient one that many
special districts could satisfy, at least when they are created by a
legislative body whose members were selected in accordance with
the Reynolds principle. 8 But other language in the Ball opinion hints
that the nature of the powers conferred on the special district may
be as significant as the extent of those powers. That is, Ball noted
that the district involved there could not "impose ad valorem or
sales taxes" or "enact any laws governing the conduct of citizens";
and even more significantly, the opinion emphasized that the Ball
district did not "administer such normal functions of government as
the maintenance of streets, the operation of schools, or sanitation,
health, or welfare services.""
33. Id. According to the Ball majority, the "constitutionality ofthe voting
scheme" was not affected by the fact that "98% of the District's revenue [came] from
the sales of electricity, and only 2% from charges assessed for water deliveries,"
because the consumers of electricity were "neither committing capital to the District
nor committing any of their property as security for the credit of the District." Id at
1820 n.19 (citations omitted).
34. Id. at 1821.
35. I. at 1820.
36. 'I at 1821 n.20. See generally id. at 1821-22 (Powell, J., concurring).
37. 1d. at 1818 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 42
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This last language could portend a relatively limited reach for
the exception, for Hadley suggests that operating schools is always
a sufficiently important governmental function to invoke the
Reynolds principle. Left unanswered is whether the other "normal
functions of government" that the Court groups with the operation
of schools will also invariably exclude the Ball exception. For example,
would a paving district fall outside the exception because its admit-
tedly narrow functions involve street maintenance? Would a sewage
district invoke Reynolds because its functions involve sanitation ser-
vice? Or would Reynolds apply to elections of the directors of a mos-
quito control district because the function the district performs is
aimed at protecting the public health?
No definitive answer to such questions can be given unless and
until the Supreme Court decides to clarify Ball in future litigation.
One can, however, make a strong argument that Reynolds should
not invariably apply to districts such as those described above. Rely-
ing solely on the type of function being exercised seems ultimately
inconsistent with the central theme of Ball, which emphasizes the
narrow range of the district's operation rather than the nature of its
functions; after all, one can make a persuasive argument that water
acquisition and storage is a rather important governmental function
in modern life." Moreover, if one accepts the range of services as
the decisive criterion, the school operation involved in Hadley can
be distinguished in either of two ways: as recognizing the especially
important role the government performs in providing public educa-
tion3" or as involving a district that actually exercised a wide range
of functions including the taxing power.
Of course, any district that seeks to fall within the Ball excep-
tion must also satisfy the second prong of the Court's test-the
burden of carrying out its functions must fall disproportionately on
the landowners who receive special voting rights. Ball seems,
however, to mark a definite relaxation of this aspect of the test by
abandoning the implicit requirement that the landowners' burdens
be proportionate to the special voting rights they receive. In Salyer,
financial burdens imposed on the landowners were tangible and im-
mediate; the annual operating costs of the project were assessed
against each landowner according to the water benefits the land-
38. Id. at 1828 (Powell, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 1821 (Powell, J., concurring); see Brown v. Board of Educ. 347 U.S. 483,
493 (1954) (" [tloday. education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments"). But see San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973) (state scheme for financing public education was judged by a rational relation-
ship test).
40. 397 U.S. at 53.
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owner received. By contrast, the burdens involved in Ball were
much less substantial; they involved stock assessments made by a
predecessor association prior to the district's formation in 1946, the
present use of the lands as security for the general obligation bonds
of the district, and the potential liability to the district's acreage-
based taxing power. Moreover, as a practical matter, the actual
chance that the landowners would be responsible for the bonds or
subject to the district's taxing power was quite small. General
obligation bonds constituted only 12 percent of the district's in-
debtedness, and the claim of those bonds to the district's revenues
was superior to the 88 percent of the indebtedness that was secured
by the revenues alone. Likewise, the sale of electricity accounted for
98 percent of the district's operating revenues and would almost cer-
tainly be the primary source of any additional charges. In fact, look-
ing at the matter from a practical perspective, not only did land-
owners not bear an extra burden, they actually paid less than the
cost of their water deliveries by subsidizing those operations from
profits from the sale of electricity."
Perhaps the most likely application of the Ball exception will
concern utility districts. Language in the Court's opinion supports
the conclusion that the provision of utility services does not involve
normal "governmental functions,"'2 if the powers given to the
district satisfy the "relatively narrow" requirement. Furthermore,
Ball suggests that the special burden prong is rather formalistic.
Apparently, its test can be satisfied if the landowners are potentially
liable for the district's bonds without inquiry into the likelihood the
landowners will actually be called on for special contributions.
Seen in a broader perspective, Ball seems part of the recent
trend towards less strict enforcement of the Reynolds principle at
the state level." Now that the worst inequities of the pre-Reynolds
system have been eliminated in most states," the Court seems will-
ing to allow states considerable room for political compromise as
long as the basic Reynolds principle is not abandoned. If this
analysis is correct, one can look for future decisions to give even
greater weight to the central theme of Mr. Justice Powell's brief
concurring opinion-the vesting of ultimate control in a legislative
41. See 101 S. Ct. at 1826-28 (White, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 1819-20. See also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353
(1974).
43. See, e.g., Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535 (1978); Gaffney v. Cummings. 412
U.S. 735 (1973); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315
(1973); Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
44. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. III, § 6 (providing for legislative reapportionment
after each decennial census).
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body whose members are selected in accordance with the Reynolds
principle.
STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS
The provisions in the Louisiana Constitution concerning local
governments operating under home rule charters'" have two pur-
poses that must be separated if problems involving the status of
local governments are to be analyzed correctly. First, the constitu-
tion defines the powers and functions that the governments can ex-
ercise. Second, the constitution also limits the state's ability to over-
rule certain local decisions.
In defining the powers and functions that governments with
home rule charters can exercise, article VI has separate provisions
for existing home rule governments (those that had home rule
charters when the constitution was adopted) and for new home rule
governments (those that have adopted home rule charters since the
adoption of the constitution). "Except as inconsistent with [the] Con-
stitution," section 4 allows the charters of existing home rule
governments to "remain in effect" and permits those governments to
"retain all powers, functions, and duties in effect" when the constitu-
tion was adopted. In addition, section 5 permits any local govern-
ment to adopt a new home rule charter, and that charter can
authorize the governing body to exercise any power or perform any
function needed to manage the local government's affairs so long as
the power or function is not "denied by general law or inconsistent
with [the] Constitution."'"
Section 6 of article VI is the provision that grants local govern-
ments with home rule charters protection from state interference
with certain decisions. It applies to both new and existing home rule
governments and prohibits the state legislature from enacting any
law changing or affecting the "structure and organization or the par-
ticular distribution and redistribution of the powers and functions"
of the local government. This language was copied from an amend-
ment to the 1921 constitution that authorized East Baton Rouge
45. Article VI, section 5 allows any "local governmental subdivision" to adopt a
home rule charter; and section 44(1) defines "local governmental subdivision" as in-
cluding "any parish or municipality." In this article, "local government" is used as
synonymous with the constitution's "local governmental subdivision" term. For more
general discussions of the powers granted to local governments by article VI, see Mur-
chison, Developments in the Law, 1979-1980-Local Government Law, 41 LA. L. REV.
483, 485 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Local Government Law-19791980 Term]; Mur-
chison, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978 Term-Local
Governmment Law, 39 LA. L. REV. 843, 851-53 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Local
Government Law-19771978 Term].
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Parish and the City of Baton Rouge to adopt a home rule charter for
a consolidated city-parish government," and the record of the 1973
Constitutional Convention 7 suggests that the particular language
was chosen to extend to all home rule governments the protection of
two decisions'8 holding that the "structure and organization"
language precluded state interference with local decisions concern-
ing the pay and benefits of firefighters.
One can, however, suggest two arguments that might reduce the
reach of the protections that home rule governments are afforded
by section 6. First, article VI, section 9(B) provides that "[niot-
withstanding any provisions of this Article, the police power of the
state shall never be abridged";" thus, to the extent that denying
state control over matters of structure and organization would
abridge the police power of the state, one can argue that section 9
would prevail. Second, one can fashion an even stronger argument
limiting section 6 on the basis of the language of article VI, section
14, which grants a more limited type of protection from state in-
terference with local affairs and applies to all local governments
whether or not they have adopted a home rule charter.
Section 14 provides that laws requiring increased expenditures
for certain pay-related benefits of local employees shall not "become
effective" until they are approved by the governing authority of the
local government or until the legislature appropriates funds suffi-
cient to cover the increased expenditures, but it excepts most pay-
related benefits of "firemen and municipal policemen" from the
scope of this protection."0 Since section 14 was adopted after section
6, the existence of the police and fire exception in section 14 raises
the question of whether the legislature retains control over pay mat-
46. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 3(A) (1921, amended 1976, repealed 1977).
47. 7 RECORDS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973: CONVENTION
TRANSCRIPTS 1342-43, 1358 (1977).
48. Letellier v. Jefferson Parish, 254 La. 1067, 229 So. 2d 101 (1969); La Fleur v.
City of Baton Rouge, 124 So. 2d 374 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960).
49. The only decision construing section 9(B) concerned a matter clearly outside
the protection afforded local governments with respect to their structure and organiza-
tion. See City of New Orleans v. State, 364 So. 2d 1020 (La. 1978).
50. The text of section 14 provides as follows:
No law requiring increased expenditures for wages, hours, working conditions,
pension and retirement benefits, vacation, or sick leave benefits of political sub-
division employees, except a law providing for civil service, minimum wages,
working conditions, and retirement benefits for firemen and municipal policemen.
shall become effective until approved by ordinance enacted by the governing
authority of the effected political subdivision or until the legislature appropriates
funds for the purpose to the effected political subdivision and only to the extent
and amount that such funds are provided. This section shall not apply to a school
board.
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ters affecting police officers and firefighters, and to resolve that
question one must decide the nature of the section 14 exception. If
the literal wording of section 14 is to be followed as some commen-
tators have urged,51 the exception is simply a limitation applicable to
one protection afforded to all local governments and has no impact
on the separate section 6 protection, which extends only to local
governments with home rule charters. But if the section 14 language
is viewed as an affirmative grant of legislative authority over the
pay of police officers and firefighters,52 all local governments would
seem to be subject to the state law governing these matters.
Unfortunately, the convention debates provide little assistance
in resolving the issue. Although the potential conflict between sec-
tions 6 and 14 was raised by a question in the debate over section
14, the question was never conclusively answered before the conven-
tion proceeded to other matters."
The supreme court has previously avoided the potential conflict
between sections 6 and 14 in two cases where the issue could have
been discussed;5' and the first circuit's recent decision in Tull v. City
of Baton Rouge55 represents still another decision that fails to define
the scope of the section 6 protection with precision. Nonetheless
Tull is a significant decision because of its holding that the "struc-
ture and organization" 6 language immunizes Baton Rouge from com-
plying with the state statute requiring certain local governments 7
to pay police officers premium pay for work in excess of forty hours
a week.
The first issue addressed in Tull was whether overtime pay for
police officers was a matter of structure and organization. In
51. Kean, A Selective Analysis of the Louisiana Constitution-1974 -Local
Government and Home Rule, 21 Loy. L. REv. 63 (1975); Comment, Exclusive Powers of
Louisiana Home Rule Municipalities and Parishes, 23 Loy. L. REv. 961, 981 (1977).
52. For an example of a decision where the Louisiana Supreme Court construed
an exception to a statutory prohibition as an affirmative requirement, see National
Foods Stores of La., Inc. v. Cefalu, 280 So. 2d 903 (La. 1973).
53. Convention Transcripts, supra note 46, at 1343-46. Perhaps the strongest piece
of legislative history suggesting that section 14 might limit section 6 is the remark of
Delegate Tate (presenting the report of the Committee on Style and Drafting) that
because of the "except as inconsistent with this Constitution" language in sections 4
and 5, section 6 would be "subject to Section 14." Id at 3324.
54. See West v. Allen, 382 So. 2d 924 (La. 1980); Bradford v. City of Shreveport,
305 So. 2d 487 (La. 1975). For an analysis of the West decision, see Local Government
Law-1979-1980 Term, supra note 45, at 490-93.
55. 385 So. 2d 343 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 392 So. 2d 663 (La. 1980).
56. LA. R.S. 33:2213 (1950 & Supp. 1976).
57. The statute applied "to municipalities having a population of not less than
twelve thousand nor more than two hundred fifty thousand." LA. R.S. 33:2211 (1950).
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answering this question in the affirmative, the first circuit relied
primarily on the pre-1974 decision of La Fleur v. City of Baton
Rouge 8 which held that a "similar statute" governing firefighters
did not apply to Baton Rouge. Although the Tull discussion cited ar-
ticle 14, section 3(a) of the 1921 constitution (the provision that
authorized East Baton Rouge Parish to adopt a home rule charter)
rather than article VI, section 6 of the 1974 constitution, the same
result should obtain under section 6 since the operative language of
the two provisions is identical.
At the conclusion of its discussion of this issue, the first circuit
initially defined its finding in broad terms, declaring that the state
statute "cannot constitutionally apply to the City of Baton Rouge ...
as the statute involves the 'structure' and 'organization' of [the city-
parish]." 9 However, the remainder of the opinion renders this initial
statement of the holding far more equivocal.
Although the plaintiff in Tull did not raise the issue of the possible
conflict between sections 6 and 14, he did argue that exempting
Baton Rouge from the statute's coverage would amount to an
abridgement of the state's police power. The court inserted an ex-
tensive quotation from La Fleur that sharply distinguished "struc-
ture and organization" from "power" and "function,"" but did not
directly address the plaintiff's issue from a constitutional perspec-
tive at this point in the opinion. Instead, it retreated to a statutory
analysis emphasizing the lack of any legislative revision since La
Fleur that would suggest a "legislative intent" to overrule the deci-
sion. Thus, the court concluded that the plaintiff had not
demonstrated a conflict with section 9(B) because the legislature had
not found "the inapplicability of the statute to East Baton Rouge ...
to constitute an abridgment of the State's police power.""
The ultimate significance of Tull is difficult to determine
because it is impossible to be certain of the precise basis of the
court's opinion. Moreover, the Louisiana Supreme Court left itself
free to adopt any logical interpretation of the Tull holding in future
litigation by merely denying writs without issuing an opinion.
At least three reasonable interpretations of the Tull opinion are
possible:
(1) Since the legislature had not acted to make the overtime
statute applicable to Baton Rouge, the question of whether section
58. 124 So. 2d 374 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960).
59. 385 So. 2d at 346.
60. Id. (quoting La Fleur v. City of Baton Rouge, 124 So. 2d 374, 379 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1960)).
61. 385 So. 2d at 347.
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9(B) limits the protection that section 6 affords to home rule govern-
ments simply did not arise in Tull.
(2) The protection afforded Baton Rouge is unique because it
was granted protection against state interference prior to the 1974
constitution and the new constitution continued that protection.
(3) Matters that concern the structure and organization of
home rule governments are peculiarly local in nature and thus ex-
cluding state control over them never amounts to an abridgment of
the state's police power.
To the extent that the Tull opinion relies on the first rationale
suggested above, it leaves the underlying constitutional issues
unresolved and thus permits the courts to postpone direct considera-
tion of the difficult constitutional questions outlined above. But the
argument supporting this interpretation is ultimately unpersuasive.
Its basic premise is the dubious assumption that La Fleur was based
on statutory construction grounds. This interpretation reads La
Fleur as holding that the original legislative intent in passing the
firefighter's statute (and, by analogy, the police statute) was to ex-
clude Baton Rouge; thus, the La Fleur construction of the statutes
remains controlling regardless of any changes that might have been
made by the 1974 constitution because the legislature has taken no
action since 1974 to change the original legislative intent. Even
though one can point to some language in La Fleur that suggests
the decision was based on statutory construction, 2 the more natural
reading is to understand La Fleur as a constitutionally based deci-
sion."3 Under this interpretation, La Fleur recognized that the
legislature intended to do what the statutory language says-to
make the firefighters statute and, by analogy, the police statute in-
volved in Tull applicable to Baton Rouge 6"-but held that the 1946
amendment to the 1921 constitution denied the legislature the
62. 124 So. 2d at 380 ("we are of the opinion that under the Constitution of this
State the provisions of [the firefighter's statute] are not applicable to the City of Baton
Rouge . ..").
63. In defining the issue before it, the La Fleur Court indicated that it was basing
its decision on a construction of the constitution, not the statute. 124 So. 2d at 376
("Basically, the issue presented for decision is whether or not the City of Baton Rouge
or the Legislature is invested with authority to fix the pay of firemen under section
3(A) of Article 14 of the Constitution of this State and the Plan of Government adopted
by the City of Baton Rouge in accordance with this constitutional mandate.").
64. Both statutes purport to apply to classes of municipalities that would seem to
include the city of Baton Rouge. LA. R.S. 33:1961 (1950 & Supp. 1962) (firefighters
statute applicable to "any paid fire department operated by a municipality which has a
population of thirteen thousand or more"); LA. R.S. 33:2211 (1950) (police statute ap-
plicable to "municipalities having a population of not less than twelve thousand nor
more than two hundred fifty thougand").
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power to bring Baton Rouge within the statutory coverage. Obviously,
this interpretation of La Fleur as a constitutional decision undercuts
the legislative intent rationale articulated in Tull. If the legislature
originally intended the statute to apply to Baton Rouge and has
done nothing to change that intent, that intent must be given effect
unless the 1974 constitution, like the 1921 constitution, denies the
legislature the power to extend the statute to include Baton Rouge."
Thus, one cannot avoid addressing the underlying questions of how
the 1974 constitution allocates power between the state legislature
and home rule government.
By citing the 1946 constitutional amendment authorizing East
Baton Rouge Parish to adopt a home rule charter rather than the
provisions of the 1974 constitution, other portions of the Tull opinion
seem to support the second rationale-that Baton Rouge has a
special constitutional status protecting it from legislative in-
terference regardless of how the 1974 constitution allocates power
between the state legislature and other home rule governments.
However, when that argument is analyzed carefully, it is also unper-
suasive for at least three reasons. First, section VI of article 6 of the
1974 constitution indicates that all local governments operating
under a home rule charter are to have the same protection against
legislative interference with "structure and organization or the par-
ticular distribution and redistribution of . . . powers and functions"
of such local governments." Second, although the 1974 constitution
provides that the "charter or plan of government" of a government
with an existing home rule charter is to "remain in effect," 7 it does
not continue the prior constitutional provisions that authorized the
adoption of those charters. Since the language protecting Baton
Rouge from state interference with its structure and organization is
not found in its charter but in the constitutional amendment
authorizing the parish to adopt the charter," the saving provision of
section 4 does not grant it any special status vis-A-vis the state.
Third, the language used in the 1946 amendment authorizing East
65. Cf. 39 Ops. ATTY. GEN. 22 (1937) (statute that was held unconstitutional under
the Federal Constitution but never repealed by Congress became effective again when
the Supreme Court formally overruled the earlier decision declaring the statute un-
constitutional).
66. The convention debates indicate that section 6 was drafted as a separate sec-
tion to make it clear that its protection extended to all local governments with home
rule charters. 9 RECORDS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973: CON-
VENTION TRANSCRIPTS 3324 (1977).
67. LA. CONST. art VI, § 4.
68. See LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 3(A) (1921, amended 1946).
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Baton Rouge Parish to adopt a home rule charter is identical to that
used in section 6; therefore, the two provisions should receive the
same construction.
Even though the first two explanations for the Tull decision of-
fer inadequate justification for the court's ruling, the holding is
nonetheless defensible and should be followed in future cases be-
cause the third rationale listed above-the argument that excluding
state control over matters of structure and organization does not
amount to an abridgment of the state's police power-merits accep-
tance. For one thing, the third rationale is consistent with the
language used in the pre-1974 decisions interpreting a phrase iden-
tical to that used in section 6. Those cases distinguished the "struc-
ture and organization" of a local government from its "power and
functions,"69 and that distinction forms a valid basis for a similar one
that separates the "structure and organization" protected in section
6 from the "police power" of section 9(B); that is, to the extent that
any provision concerns the "structure and organization" of a local
government, it does not involve a police "power" of the state. In ad-
dition, the third rationale is defensible as a practical matter. Essen-
tially, determining that something involves the structure and
organization of a local government is a decision that it is a matter of
a peculiarly local concern; therefore, excluding state interference in
such matters does not have a significant impact upon the state's
police power, which is concerned with providing for the health, safe-
ty, and welfare of the state as a whole. Indeed, to hold otherwise
would allow section 9(B) to swallow up the protection that section 6
was designed to give to local governments with home rule charters.
Of course, none of the Tull opinion's rationales addressed the
even more difficult question suggested above: whether section 14 ex-
empts the pay of police and firefighters from the coverage of section
6. The reason for that omission is obvious: the plaintiff failed to
raise the issue. Nonetheless, the question is one that the state's
courts will undoubtedly have to face at some point. Moreover, as in-
dicated above, when the courts do confront that issue, they will
discover that neither the text of the constitution nor the legislative
history contained in convention records provide an irrefutable basis
for decision. As a result, the decision is virtually certain to turn on
the court members' own views of the most desirable allocation of
power between the state and the local governments within its
borders.
69. Letellier v. Jefferson Parrish, 254 La. 1067, 1072-73, 229 So. 2d 101, 103 (1969);
La Fleur v. City of Baton Rouge, 124 So. 2d 374, 377-78 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960).
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LAND USE PLANNING
In its 1973 decision in Summerell v. Phillips,'7 the Louisiana
Supreme Court limited a local government's, discretion to decide
applications for mobile home parks on a case-by-case basis. The par-
ticular ordinance challenged in Summerell allowed mobile homes in
areas with "rural" zoning only if they were located in "trailer park
or mobile home district[s]"" and provided that the city council would
decide to establish such districts only after receiving a proposal for
locating a particular park. In holding this ordinance invalid, the
court held that when a local government created a zoning district
but left the precise geographical location of the district to future
proceedings, it must establish standards to guide the future
deliberations as to whether a proposed location should be approved.
Judged by this requirement, the ordinance in Summerell was un-
constitutional because it "reveal[ed] no objective standard for the
establishment" of the mobile home zones and thus "[njo applicant
[could] know, by reading the ordinance, what he must do to have his
property established as a mobile home district.""
Two decisions decided during the 1980-81 term confirm that
Summereli remains an important limit on zoning authority. But they
also demonstrate that the limitation imposed by Summerell is a narrow
one that only applies when the local government attempts to
recognize a given use as permissible in certain areas while reserving
to itself unfettered discretion to approve or disapprove specific pro-
posals.
Tiber Petroleum, Inc. v. Parish of Jefferson73 involved an at-
tempt by the parish to permit the location of oil storage tanks in a
certain zoning district but only when the parish council approved
the construction of the particular storage tank. The ordinance at-
tacked in Tiber listed "wholesale storage of petroleum" as a permitted
use in an M-2 district if "an ordinance of no objection" to the pro-
70. 282 So. 2d 450 (La. 1973).
71. Id. at 451. The ordinance also permitted mobile home parks in certain commer-
cial and industrial districts without the requirement that the land be rezoned to the
"T" classification. Id.
72. Id. at 453.
73. 391 So. 2d 1178 (La. 1980). Mr. Justice Dennis dissented. Without mentioning
Summerell, he declared that "Imlany courts have held that where the legislative
authority reserves itself the power to issue or withhold permits, it need not articulate
the standards which will guide or limit the exercise of such a power." Id. at 1180 (Den-
nis, J., dissenting). These cases, he argued, suggested "the wiser course" in a case like
Tiber, "where the parish council has reserved to itself the power to decide whether to
permit a potentially dangerous activity in a highly populous metropolitan area." Id. at
1180. (Dennis, J., dissenting).
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posed use was approved by the parish council." Applying the Sum-
merell standard, the Louisiana Supreme Court had little difficulty
ruling the ordinance unconstitutional because of "the absence of any
criteria for one petroleum facility to be approved and another disap-
proved.""
In defending the ordinance, the parish argued that "it was
designed to safeguard the public against unsafe refineries." The
court conceded that this goal ranked "high on the scale of zoning ob-
jectives" and that the legislative body had "greater discretion in
zoning to protect the public safety than it does in pursuing less com-
pelling purposes." The court insisted, however, that this discretion
did not include the authority to decide on individual projects with-
out specifying in advance the criteria according to which its discre-
tion would be exercised. Tested by this standard, the Tiber or-
dinance was defective because it established no "guidelines for its
application," stated no policy behind the requirement, and did not
even impose a "minimum standard" by declaring that an ordinance
of no objection would be approved if the proposed use did not "pres-
ent a hazard to the public.""6
Offering a revealing contrast to Tiber is the court's nearly con-
temporaneous decision in Kirk v. Town of Westlake." The ordinance
involved in Kirk zoned the plaintiff's property "R-1" and "R-M."
Mobile home parks were not permitted uses in either of those
districts, although they were permitted in land zoned "T-1." Kirk
sought to have his land rezoned to a T-1 classification, but the town
board denied the requested change and the courts rejected judicial
attacks on that denial." Kirk then filed a second suit alleging that
Westlake's zoning ordinance was unconstitutional under Summerell,
and the district court agreed because the ordinance did "not set
74. Id. at 1179. Jefferson Parish was granted zoning authority by 1946 and 1954
amendments to the 1921 constitution. See LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 29(A) (1921, amended
1946 & 1954). Presumably, that authority continues under the 1974 constitution, see
LA. CONST. art. VI, § 17, even though the state has not adopted any comprehensive set
of "uniform procedures" governing zoning by parishes. See LA. R.S. 33:4877.1 (Supp.
1976). See generally Marcel & Bockrath, Regional Governments and Coastal Zone
Management in Louisiana, 40 LA. L. REV. 887, 897-901 (1980); Murchison. The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1979 Term-Local Government Law, 40
LA. L. REV. 681, 706-07 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Local Government Law-19781979].
75. 391 So. 2d at 1180.
76. Id.
77. 387 So. 2d 1157 (La. 1980); accord, Baeher v. City of Lake Charles, 387 So. 2d
1160, 1161 n.2 (La. 1980).
78. Kirk v. Town of Westlake, 373 So. 2d 601 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 376
So. 2d 1268 (La. 1979).
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forth sufficient guidelines and criteria to insure that all those
similarly situated will be treated alike." 9
'The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed." The Westlake ordin-
ance, the court emphasized, made "no provision" for the establish-
ment of mobile home parks in districts classified R-1 or R-M. In-
stead, it restricted mobile home parks to "those areas zoned only for
that purpose." Thus, the question raised in Kirk was "substantially
different" from that raised in Summerell. In Summerell "full discre-
tion was given to the zoning authority to vary the classification of
the district in question but no criteria were provided for the exercise
of that power." By contrast, the Kirk ordinance never gave the zon-
ing authority the power to vary the classification "in the first
place"; once an area was zoned for a particular classification, it could
only be used for whatever uses were "set out in that classification,"
and the range of permissible uses could "only be changed if the area
[was] rezoned."'"
At first glance, Kirk's qualification of the Summerell-Tiber prin-
ciples seems formalistic rather than functional. In both cases the
local government retained the substantive authority to permit pro-
posed land uses without providing standards to control that substan-
tive decision, and the difference between the powers reserved was a
matter of form: in Summerell and Tiber, the reservation was ex-
pressly stated in the ordinance itself; in Kirk, the authority was im-
plied as part of the local governing body's power to make reasonable
amendments to the zoning ordinance. Thus, one could argue that
Kirk allowed the local governing body to do the very thing Sum-
mereUl and Tiber forbade, so long as the form of the ordinance was
proper.
However, closer analysis of the ordinances involved in the three
cases enables one to discover a valid functional basis for the Kirk
qualification. In fact, the functional distinction by which Kirk can be
justified is the very one on which much of the modern ad-
ministrative law is based: the difference between the exercise of
legislative authority and the performance of judicial or quasi-judicial
functions."a In adopting and implementing zoning controls, the same
local government exercises both legislative and quasi-judicial
79. 387 So. 2d at 1158-59 (quoting the opinion of the district judge).
80. The case was appealed directly to the supreme court because the district
judge had declared the local ordinance unconstitutional. See LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(D).
81. 387 So, 2d at 1159.
82. Unfortunately, the Louisiana courts have not always drawn this distinction
with precision. See, e.g., Landry v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 352 So. 2d 656 (La.
1977). criticized in Note, Special Problems of Interpretation Arising Out of Procedure
for Levying Special Assessments, 38 LA. L. REV. 1073, 1076 (1978).
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powers. When it establishes (or re-establishes) zoning districts, the
body is using its legislative authority and the type of action will not
be overturned unless the substantive decision amounts to an
unreasonable exercise of police power." On the other hand, when
the legislature approves specific proposals for uses within a
previously created district, it is exercising a quasi-judicial function
and must act in conformity with previously established criteria.
If the usefulness of this legislative-judicial distinction is ac-
cepted, the court's decisions in Kirk and Tiber are easily defended.
In Kirk, the town's power to rezone property into a classification
that permitted mobile home parks involved the power to change its
past decisions regarding a matter of policy and thus was an integral
part of the governing body's legislative authority; inasmuch as the
power thus reserved was legislative in nature, the governing body
was not required to articulate standards to guide future decisions
and the only substantive review to which such a decision was sub-
ject was to determine if it was a reasonable exercise of the police
power. By contrast, in Tiber and in Summerell the local governing
body not only reserved the right to reconsider the zoning ordinance
in future legislative actions but also entrusted a quasi-judicial func-
tion to itself: it permitted particular uses in certain districts only
when the governing body approved a specific proposal from in-
dividual land owners. Because the decision that the governing body
entrusted to itself had an adjudicative or quasi-judicial character,
due process required that the governing body set forth in advance
the criteria it would use to judge individual proposals.
One should emphasize that neither Summerell nor Tiber forbids
the designation of certain uses as "special exceptions" that are per-
mitted in particular zoning districts on a case-by-case basis.
Previous decisions in Louisiana' and elsewhere"5 have upheld that
approach as a valid zoning technique, and nothing in Summerell or
Tiber indicates dissatisfaction with those cases. The SummereU1-
Tiber principle simply imposes a narrow procedural limitation on
the technique by requiring that the local government specify in ad-
vance the criteria by which it will judge individual cases.
83. The town's refusal to rezone Kirk's property into a district in which mobile
home parks were permitted was held to be a reasonable exercise of the police power in
the first litigation. See Kirk v. Town of Westlake, 373 So. 2d 601 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
writ denied, 376 So. 2d 1268 (La. 1979).
84. See, e.g., Cook v. Metropolitan Shreveport Bd. of Appeals, 339 So. 2d 1225,
1229-31 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976), writ denied, 341 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1977); Reeves v.
North Shreve Baptist Church, 163 So. 2d 458 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
85. See, e.g., Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. County of McHenry, 41 III. 2d 77, 241
N.E.2d 454 (1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10913 (1972). See generally Mandelker,
Delegation of Power and Function in Zoning Administration. 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 60.
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TORT LIABILITY
The Responsible Government Entity
Louisiana.'s appellate courts continue to struggle with the pro-
blem of liability for torts committed by state officers who serve
within the boundaries of a single local government. In two 1980 deci-
sions, the Louisiana Supreme Court extended the Foster v. Hamp-
ton86 holding (that the state is liable for torts committed by deputy
sheriffs) to torts committed by other public officers who serve within
the boundaries of a particular local government. In addition, deci-
sions by the courts of appeal rejected attempts to restrict Foster to
its particular facts. One of these appellate courts also held that the
1978 legislative response to Foster did not affect the state's liability
for torts committed by deputy sheriffs.
The first of the supreme court decisions was Hyrhorchuk v.
Smith,87 which ruled that the constable of a ward in Calcasieu Parish
was an employee of the state rather than the parish. According to
the Hyrhorchuk majority, neither the parish governing body nor the
parish sheriff "exercised any supervision of [the constable's] activi-
ties, the most important element in determining employee status."88
To the contrary, "[a] constable is an elected officer whose duties are
similar to those of a sheriff," except that he has fewer powers and
serves a smaller jurisdiction." Like sheriffs and their deputies, con-
stables are "state officer[s]" because they "perform public functions
with authority derived from the state by legislative enactment" and
they exercise "a delegated portion of the sovereign power of the
State of Louisiana. 90
86. 352 So. 2d 197 (La. 1977). For a critique of the Foster decision, see Local
Government Law-1977-78 Term, supra note 44, at 871-79. See also Foster v. Hamp-
ton, 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980); Local Government Law-1979-1980 Term, supra note 45,
at 518-24.
87. 390 So. 2d 497 (La. 1980). For a discussion of the third circuit's holding as to
the status of the constable, see Local Government Law-1979-1980, supra note 45, at
521-22, 524.
Justices Marcus. Lemmon, and Blanche dissented from the Hryhorchuk holding
that the state is liable for the torts of a constable. 390 So. 2d at 503-04. None of them,
however, offered any detailed analysis of the nature of the constable's office.
88. 390 So. 2d at 501. Hryhorchuk treated the parish's duty to pay part of the con-
stable's salary as insignificant. Accord, Mullins v. State, 387 So. 2d 1151, 1153-64 (La.
1980); Cosenza v. Aetna Ins. Co., 341 So. 2d 1304, 1305 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
89. 390 So. 2d at 502.
90. Id. The court specifically noted that state law imposed the following duties on
constables: making returns on service, LA. R.S. 15:30 (1950 & Supp. 1966); preserving
the peace, LA. R.S. 13:2586.1 (Supp. 1975); and seizing and selling property. LA. R.S.
13:2585 (Supp. 1960).
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Mullins v. State,1 the other supreme court decision, extended
Foster to encompass coroners. According to the Mullins majority,
State v. Taylor" enunciated the appropriate rule for distinguishing
state and local offices: "If the office is created by the legislature, or
is established in the first instance of the Constitution, it is a state
office." 3  That rule, the majority emphasized, established "a
reasonable and practical guide for determining whether a particular
office or agency is part of the state government or is parochial or
local in character" because creating an office "involves a delegation
to the individual [appointed to the office] of some of the sovereign
functions" of the government that creates it."
Applying this Taylor test, the Mullins opinion concluded that
the coroner, like the sheriff, was a state officer. The court arti-
culated two reasons in support of this conclusion: the constitutional
origin of the office and the modern regulation of the office. The con-
stitution created the office of coroner and also denied the parish the
''power to abolish this constitutionally created office," thus making
the coroner a state officer even though the coroner's jurisdiction
was limited by the boundaries of the particular parish." In addition
to emphasizing the constitutional protection of the office, Mullins
also noted that ultimate control of the office remained in state
rather than parochial hands. Even though the duties of the coroner
had "changed profoundly since the twelfth century," modern regula-
tion of the coroner continued to emanate from "the state legislature,
and not the local governing authority. '
91. 387 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980). Justices Marcus, Blanche, and Lemmon all filed
dissenting opinions arguing that coroners were parochial rather than state officers. Id.
at 1154. Justice Lemmon favored overruling Foster expressly rather than merely
distinguishing it. Id.
92. 44 La. Ann. 783, 11 So. 132 (1892).
93. 387 So. 2d at 1152 (quoting State v. Taylor, 44 La. Ann. 783, 784, 11 So. 132,
133 (1892)).
94. 387 So. 2d at 1152.
95. Id. (quoting LA. CONST. art. V, § 29).
96. 387 So. 2d at 1152-1153. The supreme court specifically discounted the
significance of the two factors on which the court of appeals had relied in ruling the
coroner's office to be a parochial or local one: the authority of the parish governing
authority to appoint an interim coroner when a vacancy occurs and the parish's duty to
pay the "necessary or unavoidable expenses" of the coroner's office. According to the
Mullins majority, the appointment authority was insufficient to change the "state
nature of the coroner's office" for two reasons. First, a parish has the appointment
authority only when a coroner's office has no "chief deputy." Second, the parish
appointment is effective "only until the vacancy is filled by election." Id at 1153. As
for the parish's duty to pay the ordinary expenses of the coroner's office, the court
held that responsibility likewise insufficient to defect the state nature of the office."
Parishes, the court emphasized, are often required to support state offices like city
courts and district attorneys, but the offices nonetheless continue to operate "in-
dependently of regulation of the local governing authority." Id. at 1153-54.
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Various decisions in the courts of appeal applied the specific
holding of Foster-that deputy sheriffs are employees of the
state-in a variety of settings. Michaelman v. Amiss97 rejected a
suggestion that Foster be interpreted to impose state liability only
when the deputy sheriff was performing "judicial" rather than "law
enforcement" functions." According to the first circuit, the supreme
court's Foster ruling intended that deputies should be recognized
"as .. .employee[s] of the State regardless of the factual situations";
and the state was, therefore, liable for the negligent performance of
the law enforcement duty of jail management."
Subsequently, the first circuit relied on its "regardless of the
factual situation" language in Michaelman as the basis for expanding
Foster to cover a worker's compensation claim. Rodrigue v.
Breaux'0 held that, as the employer of the deputy sheriff who filed a
worker's compensation claim, the state was an indispensable party
in a suit to collect benefits under Louisiana's worker's compensation
statute. Finally, in Carrmouche v. Oubre,"'0 the fourth circuit ruled
that a petition sufficient to allege a malicious prosecution claim
against a deputy sheriff also stated a claim against the state as his
employer. Since the petition alleged that "the wrongful acts of [the
deputy) were committed in the course and scope of his employment,"
it was "sufficient to state a cause of action for vicarious liability
against the State."'02
Carmouche may well be the most significant of the decisions in
the courts of appeal for its additional holding that the 1978 amend-
ments to the Revised Statutes,"3 passed by the legislature in ap-
parent response to Foster, did not relieve the state of liability for
torts committed by deputy sheriffs. According to Carmouche, the
statute was not controlling because it merely relieved the state of
liability for the "employees" of sheriffs and other constitutional of-
ficers. Since Foster had previously ruled that deputies were
"employees of the State rather than the Sheriff," the statute was in-
applicable to them.
97. 385 So. 2d 404 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
98. Id at 405.
99. Id.
100. 388 So. 2d 60 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
101. 394 So. 2d 805 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981). For a contrary decision reported after
the preparation of this article, see Martinez v. Reynolds, 398 So. 2d 156 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1981).
102. 394 So. 2d at 807.
103. 1978 La. Acts, No. 318, amending LA. R.S. 33:1433 (1950 & Supp. 1868, 1972 &
1978), adding LA. R.S. 42:1441. For a discussion of the 1978 amendment, see Local
Government Law-1977.1978 Term, supra note 45, at 877-78.
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The recent decisions have probably not produced a state of doc-
trinal equilibrium concerning who should be held liable for torts
committed by officers who serve within the boundaries of a single
local government. Hyrhorchuk and Mullins reaffirm and extend the
Foster holding to other offices, but neither decision articulates a
completely satisfactory test for distinguishing state and local offices.
In both cases, the Court ignored the opportunity to move beyond
the "state officer" 104 criterion of Foster, although Hyrhorchuk's con-
cern with who supervises the officer and the Mullins emphasis on
contemporary regulatory authority over the particular office may
signal the emergence of a more functional approach in the future.
Moreover, the court's four-to-three split in both cases suggests that
a significant minority of the court remains somewhat dissatisfied
with imposing liability on the state for torts committed by public
servants over whom the state exercises no effective control.'
Further legislation on the subject seems at least as likely as
additional doctrinal development. The holding in Carmouche that
the 1978 statutory revisions did not eliminate the state's liability for
torts committed by deputy sheriffs seems virtually certain to pro-
duce more legislative attempts to overrule Foster. Unfortunately,
the existing confusion over the reach of Foster is likely to continue
so long as the legislature confines its response to attempts designed
to overturn the results in particular cases. To put the Foster-related
problems to rest, the legislature must begin working to develop a
comprehensive statutory scheme that will allocate liability for torts
committed by state officers serving local governments."' That task,
though not an easy one, can be completed if the legislature con-
siders the problem from a general perspective instead of reacting to
specific decisions.
104. In a decision rendered after this article was prepared, the Louisiana Supreme
Court confirmed that the sheriff was not personally liable for the torts of his deputies,
but held that he was liable in his "official" capacity. Jenkins v. Jefferson Parish
Sheriffs Office, 402 So. 2d 669 (La. 1981). As a practical matter, the Jenkins decision
seems to overrule earlier cases holding that the sheriff's office was not a legal entity
capable of suing and being sued. See generally Local Government Law-1977-1978
Term, supra note 45, at 871-72 n.132.
105. For more detailed criticisms of relying on the "state officer" label, see Local
Government Law-1979-1980 Term, supra note 45, at 524; Murchison, The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977 Term-Local Government Law, 38 LA.
L. REV. 462, 479-80 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Local Government Law-19761977
Term].
106. Accord. Jenkins v. Jefferson Parish Sheriffs Office, 402 So. 2d 669. 672 (La.
1981). For a suggestion as to one direction such a comprehensive solution could take,
see Local Government Law-1977-1978 Term, supra note 45, at 878-79.
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Standards of Care
Strict Liability Under Article 2317
Since 1975, the decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court have
increasingly allowed recovery under article 2317 of the Civil Code'07
in situations when the plaintiff's proof was insufficient to satisfy the
requirements of a traditional negligence action. The seminal case
was Loescher v. Parr,' a 1975 decision holding that article 2317
created an alternate source of tort liability. As explained in
Loescher, the plaintiff has to establish only three elements to per-
mit recovery under article 2317: that the thing causing the injury
was in the care or custody of the defendant, that the thing had a
vice or defect, and that the vice or defect caused the plaintiff's in-
jury. Once these elements are established, the defendant can escape
liability only if he can demonstrate that the harm was caused by the
fault of the victim, by the fault of a third person, or by an irresistible
force.'09
If recent decisions are a reliable guide, article 2317 will provide
a significant source of exposure to tort liability for local govern-
ments. Two supreme court opinions have confirmed that the
Loescher test for liability applies in actions against governmental
defendants,"' and other opinions in the courts of appeal suggest that
article 2317 will feature prominently in future litigation."'
Jones v. City of Baton Rouge"2 involved a "catch-basin" cover
that "suddenly gave way beneath [Mrs. Jones]" causing her to fall
into the catch-basin. Unable to "produce any evidence that negligent
107. Article 2317 provides in pertinent part:
We are responsible, not only for the damage occasioned by our own act, but for
that which is caused by the act of persons for whom we are answerable, or of
things which we have in our custody.
108. 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1978), noted in Note, The "Discovery" of Article 2317, 37
LA. L. REv 234 (1976).
109. 324 So. 2d at 447, 449.
110. Shipp v. City of Alexandria. 395 So. 2d 727, 729 (La. 1981); Jones v. City of
Baton Rouge, 388 So. 2d 737, 740 (La. 1980).
111. See. e.g., Smith v. Town of Logansport, 395 So. 2d 888 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981);
Stablier v. City of Baton Rouge, 393 So. 2d 148 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); Wall v. Village
of Tallulah, 385 So. 2d 905 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 393 So. 2d 737 (La. 1980). Cf.
Baggett v. City of Bogalusa, 391 So. 2d 1210 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980) (city held liable
for street defect under negligence theory).
112. 388 So. 2d 737 (La. 1980). Justices Marcus and Blanche dissented in Jones. Mr.
Justice Marcus filed a dissenting opinion in which he argued that the redactors of the
Civil Code never "intended [article] 2317 to apply to public things . . . such as the
catch-basin in the instant case"; thus, the extension of Loescher to law suits against
governmental defendants was "unwarranted." Id. at 740-41 (Marcus, J., dissenting).
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acts or omissions on the part of the defendant's employees had caused
the collapse of the cover," the plaintiffs relied on the "strict" liability
imposed by article 2317."
The Louisiana Supreme Court emphatically rejected the sugges-
tion that article 2317 should not apply in suits against public bodies.
According to the Jones majority, the "unequivocal" rejection of the
doctrine of governmental immunity in the 1974 constitution"' made
it inappropriate for courts to refuse to apply the normal standards
for 2317 liability in actions against governmental defendants."' As a
result, the court did not consider directly the defendant's contention
that making governments liable under 2317 would achieve "chaotic
results" because of the "vast operations and extensive property
ownership" of such entities."'
After refusing to recognize a governmental exception to 2317
liability, the court had little difficulty in holding that the particular
defendant before it in Jones was liable under the Loescher prin-
ciples. In the view of the majority, the defective character of the
catch-basin was "obvious" because "the risk of falling four or five
feet into a catch-basin as a result of stepping upon a presumably
solid, firm metal surface is unreasonable.".. In addition, testimony
of the defendant's own employees demonstrated that the defendant
had custody of the catch-basin and its cover, and other testimony
showed that the plaintiffs' damages were caused by the cover's
defect. Since the defendant could not establish any of the affirm-
ative defenses recognized by Loescher,"8 the plaintiffs' evidence on
these three elements was sufficient to impose liability on the defen-
dant.
113. Id. at 739. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not aid the plaintiff "because
the catch-basin cover, located as it was on a public street, was not under the exclusive
control of the defendants' employees." Id. (citing Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof
by Inferrence, 4 LA. L. REV. 70 (1941)). Furthermore, the plaintiff could not prove that
the local government was negligent in performing "its duty to correct a dangerous
street . . . condition." That duty arises "only if [the local government] has actual or
constructive notice of the existence of the condition," and the plaintiff could not prove
either type of notice. 388 So. 2d at 739 (citing Pickens v. St. Tammany Parish Police
Jury, 323 So. 2d 430 (La. 1975)).
114. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 10. See generally Local Government Law-1976.1977
Term, supra note 105, at 474 n.73.
115. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 10. See generally Local Government Law-1976-1977
Term, supra note 105, at 474 n.73.
116. The possibility of such "chaotic results" was the basis for a 1977 decision of
the third circuit to exclude governmental defendants from liability under article 2317.
See Gallien v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 353 So. 2d 1127 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
117. 388 So. 2d at 740.
118. See the text accompanying note 109, supra.
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Shipp v. City of Alexandria"9 was the other supreme court deci-
sion applying 2317 to a governmental defendant. The opinion in-
dicates that local governments are not liable for all damages suf-
fered by persons who fall and injure themselves on public streets.
The plaintiff in Shipp was a 61-year-old woman with impaired vision
who fell when she stepped off a curb onto what the trial judge
described as a "hole or expansion joint" in the street.2 ' The
plaintiff's evidence indicated that the hole in the street pavement
was "an inch and a half to two inches deeper than the surrounding
concrete,"''I but the plaintiff offered no proof as to the "width of the
'hole' or the height of the curb from which the plaintiff stepped."'2 2
Based on this evidence, the supreme court held that the city was not
liable for the injuries suffered by Mrs. Shipp. The proof, the court
ruled, was inadequate to establish that the street had a vice or a
defect because it did not demonstrate that the defective area "occa-
sioned an unreasonable risk of injury to [the plaintiff.]" Moreover,
the Shipp majority was unwilling to rely on the fact that the plain-
tiff fell as sufficient evidence to "elevate the condition of the street
to that of an unreasonably dangerous vice or defect."'2 3
Justice Marcus' majority opinion in Shipp distinguished Jones
on the different nature of the risks involved. In Jones, the cover of
the catch-basin was defective because "the risk of falling four or five
feet to a catch-basin as a result of stepping down upon a solid, firm
metal surface was unreasonable." By contrast, the "imperfection in
the street pavement" proved in Shipp did not create a "risk of fall-
ing and suffering an injury" that "was so unreasonable as to justify
the imposition of non-negligent liability."'2 4
Though this article is not the appropriate forum for a general
evaluation of the merits and demerits of 2317 liability,' Jones and
119. 395 So. 2d 727 (La. 1981). Justice Lemmon filed a brief concurring statement
in which he emphasized the "minor" character of the "imperfection in the street."
Even though that imperfection presented "some risk of harm," he was unwilling to
"say that the risk Iwas] unreasonable" when that risk was "weighed against the Utility
of the City's operation of public streets." Id. at 730 (Lemmon, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 728.
121. The plaintiff and other members of the family testified to this effect, and Mrs.
Shipp also introduced pictures that showed a "broken area in the pavement." Id. at
729.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id
125. See generally Verlander, Art. 2317 Liability: An Analysis of Louisiana
Jurisprudence Since Loescher v. Parr, 25 Loy. L. REV. 263 (1979); Comment, Does
Louisiana Really Have Strict Liability Under Civil Code Articles 2317, 2318, and
2321? 40 LA. L. REV. 207 (1979); Note, The "Discovery" of Article 2317, 37 LA. L. REV.
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Shipp deserve examination because they indicate some of the special
problems that are likely to arise in applying 2317 to lawsuits against
governmental defendants. Specifically, when read together Jones
and Shipp reveal the constitutional basis for imposing 2317 liability
on governmental bodies, indicate that the "unreasonableness" of the
risk presented will be the primary determinant of whether liability
is imposed, and suggest that the mere occurrence of the injury will
be insufficient to prove that the risk is unreasonable.
In refusing to infer a governmental exception to 2317 liability,
the court relied solely on the "unequivocal" waiver of governmental
immunity in the 1974 constitution and did not even consider the
question of whether such an exception was justifiable on policy
grounds. This constitutional grounding for the rejection of a govern-
mental exception seems particularly significant in light of subse-
quent legislative attempts to overrule Jones. Insofar as any new
legislation tries to preclude the applicability of 2317 to governmental
defendants 2 ' rather than to redefine the standard of liability applic-
able to all defendants, the supreme court is likely to hold it un-
constitutional. As decisions dealing with other aspects of govern-
mental immunity have emphasized, the legislature is as powerless as
the courts to engraft exceptions onto the "unequivocal" constitu-
tional mandate.
But if local governments cannot completely avoid liability under
2317, Shipp suggests that their liability under that article may be
less onerous than first appeared likely. Justice Marcus' distinction of
Jones reiterates that strict liability will be imposed under article
2317 only when the risk created by the "imperfection" of the thing
causing injury is "unreasonable."'28 Moreover, the test that the
Shipp opinion seems to establish on the reasonableness issue is one
that should not inevitably impose liability on governmental defen-
dants. Implicitly, the court seems to be balancing the utility of
governmental operation of streets against the risk of injury from
the particular imperfection that resulted in the injury of the plain-
tiff." The utility of street operation is not so great as to preclude
234 (1976). Professor Wex Malone is preparing a comprehensive analysis of the article
2317 decisions that will appear in a forthcoming Issue of this REVIEW.
126. Attempting to exempt governmental defendants is the legislative approach
that the Louisiana Municipal Association has endorsed. See 5 LA. MUN. L.J. 7
(Mar.-Apr. 1981).
127. See Segura v. Louisiana Architects Selection Bd., 362 So. 2d 498 (La. 1978).
For a discussion of the Segura opinion, see Local Government Law-1978.1979 Term,
supra note 45, at 712-13.
128. 395 So. 2d at 729.
129. See id. at 730 (Lemmon, J., dissenting). In other decisions not involving
governmental defendants, the court has been more explicit as to the balancing test in-
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liability when the likelihood of serious injury is great and the im-
perfection would not have been apparent to an attentive person of
ordinary competence (the Jones facts), but the utility is sufficient to
preclude liability when the likelihood of serious injury is rather
small and the defective character of the thing would have been ap-
parent to an attentive person with good vision (the Shipp facts). Un-
fortunately, the implicit nature of the court's balancing analysis
makes successful prediction impossible in the middle areas: when
the risk of serious injury is slight but existence of the imperfection
would not have been apparent to an attentive person of ordinary
competence or when the risk of serious injury is great but the ex-
istence of the imperfection would have been apparent to an atten-
tive person of ordinary competence.
The standard of proof that Shipp requires plaintiffs to meet in
street imperfection cases also seems somewhat stricter than the one
the court has required in cases alleging that machines are defective.
In Marquez v. City Stores, Co., 13 for example, the court held that
the mere occurrence of an accident on an escalator in an "unusual"
manner was sufficient proof that the escalator had a defect within
the meaning of article 2317. By contrast, Shipp held that the plain-
tiff's fall was insufficient to prove that the street had such a defect.
Although the court never specifies what additional proof was needed
in Shipp, the answer seems to be that suggested above: the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the street's condition would have presented
a substantial danger of falling and suffering serious injury for per-
sons of ordinary competence in the community.
Considered together then, Jones and Shipp indicate that local
governments will face significant exposure to tort liability under
article 2317 but that the imposition of liability will be less than
automatic. In addition, the opinions point the direction for permiss-
ible legislative tinkering with current doctrine. To withstand con-
stitutional objections, the legislature must focus on modifying the
general standard of liability applied in 2317 actions rather than on
exempting governmental defendants from that standard.
Public Duty Doctrine
One additional decision deserves attention because it raises the
important question of whether some peculiarly governmental act-
volved. See Hunt v. City Stores, Inc., 387 So. 585, 588 (La. 1980) ("In both negligence
and strict liability cases, the probability and magnitude of the risk are to be balanced
against the utility of the thing."). See also Stablier v. City of Baton Rouge, 393 So. 2d
148, 150-53 (Lear, J., dissenting).
130. Marquez v. City Stores Co., 371 So. 2d 810 (La. 1979).
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ivities require the development of unique principles of tort liability.
In such situations, the issue is not whether normal standards of
liability should be applied in cases involving governmental entities
as defendants, but what standard ought to apply with respect to
enterprises operated only by governmental defendants.'3'
A device many states have used to limit governmental liability
for such enterprises is the public duty doctrine. To apply the doc-
trine, one must first determine if the duty imposed on a public of-
ricer is one owed to the public or to a particular individual. Tort
liability attaches only if the duty is one to the individual; if the duty
is owed to the public generally, it is to be redressed only by
criminal law or by the administrative or political process.'32
Some courts and commentators have criticized the public duty
doctrine in recent years.'33 Nonetheless, many courts have continued
to rely on it,'34 and Louisiana's fourth circuit has applied the doc-
trine in at least two cases in recent years.' The Louisiana Supreme
Court had, however, never directly considered the issue until it
refused to apply the doctrine to excuse a local government from
liability in Stewart v. Schmieder.'"
The Stewart plaintiffs were injured when a privately owned
building collapsed during the final stages of construction. The cause
of the collapse was a "shear failure" in the building concrete roof,
and that "failure was the result of faulty design which allowed insuf-
ficient support for the roof and failed to take into account the
shrinkage which occurred when the concrete roof cured."'3 7
Even though the parish neither designed nor constructed the
building, the supreme court held that the inadequate supervision of
construction provided by the parish's building officer rendered the
parish liable for the injuries. Justice Dixon's majority opinion em-
131. See generally Van Alstyne, Government Tort Liability: A Decade of Change,
1966 U. ILL. L.F. 919, 922-23.
132. See COOLEY ON TORTS § 300, at 385 (4th ed. 1952), quoted in Stewart v.
Schmieder, 386 So. 2d 1351, 1357 (La. 1980).
133. E.g.. Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241-43 (Alaska 1971); Coffey v. City of
Milwaukee, 74 Wisc. 2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132, 138-39 (1976); Sellers, State Tort Liability
for Negligent Fire Inspections, 13 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 303 (1977); Comment,
Municipal Liability for Negligent Inspection, 23 Loy. L. REV. 458 (1977).
134. E.g., Duran v. City of Tucson, 20 Ariz. App. 22, 509 P.2d 1059 (1973): Hoffert
v. Owatonna In Town Motel Inc., 293 Minn. 220, 199 N.W.2d 158 (1972); Sanchez v.
Village of Liberty, 42 N.Y.2d 876, 397 N.Y. Supp. 2d 782, 366 N.E.2d 870 (1977).
135. Perret v. City of Westwego. 364 So. 2d 1070 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978); Dufrene
v. Guarino, 343 So. 2d 1097 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 343 So. 2d 1069 (La. 1977).
136. 386 So. 2d 1351 (La. 1980). Mr. Justice Marcus dissented without opinion.
137. Id. at 1354.
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phasized that, in addition. to assigning general law enforcement
duties to the building official, the parish building code imposed two
specific duties on him: (1) before issuing a building permit, he was to
require that a licensed architect or engineer submit "detailed plans
and specifications" and a certificate as to the structural soundness
of these plans;' 8 and (2) he was supposed to examine the plans that
the architect or engineer submitted "to determine that they comply
with the laws and ordinances in effect and that the proposed con-
struction is safe."'39 Since the evidence revealed that no qualified
employee of the permit department examined the Stewart plans and
also demonstrated that such an examination would have uncovered
the design defect that caused the building to collapse, "' the supreme
court held the local government liable for "those injured and killed
when the building proved to be structurally unsound..""
The court expressly rejected the argument that the public duty
doctrine precluded the imposition of liability on the governmental
defendant in Stewart, but the basis for that rejection is difficult to
pinpoint with precision. Initially, the majority declared that "the
mere fact that a duty is of a public nature, and benefits the general
public, does not require the conclusion that [a local government] can-
not be found liable for the breach of that duty."'4 2 However, the
court immediately followed this declaration with a two-paragraph
explanation that the public duty doctrine would not bar liability in
Stewart because the duty breached by the building official was
"designed to protect a particular class of individuals.""143
138. Baton Rouge Building Code § 102.6. quoted in Stewart v. Schmieder. 386 So.
2d 1351, 1354 (La. 1980). The court held that the requirement for a certification by an
architect or engineer did not relieve the parish of its responsibility to evaluate the
structural soundness of the plans. Id. at 1356.
139. Baton Rouge Building Code § 102.9, quoted in Stewart v. Schmieder, 386 So.
2d 1351, 1355 (La. 1980). See also Baton Rouge Building Code § 5(b) (A building official
"shall examine premises for which permits have been issued, and shall make necessary
inspections to see that the provisions of law are complied with and that the construc-
tion is prosecuted safely.").
140. 386 So. 2d at 1355-56. Although an employee of the permit department reviewed
the plans, "he was in fact not qualified by experience or education" to judge the struc-
tural soundness of the plans. Id. at 1356.
141. Id. at 1355.
142. Id. at 1357-58. The Stewart opinion noted that in at least three types of cases.
the Louisiana Supreme Court had, in the past, imposed liability on governmental en-
tities or public officials even though the alleged breaches concerned "duties which, at
first blush, appeared to be owed to the public rather than [to] any individual": failing
to maintain streets and highways in a reasonable safe condition, negligently permitting
incarcerated criminals to escape, and knowingly authorizing the creation of new sub-
divisions that would cause flooding. Id. at 1257-58.
143. Id. at 1358 ("It is plain from [the language of the Building Code] that the
building official, in addition to his general law enforcement duties, was charged with a
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The decision in Stewart is not particularly troublesome on its
facts. The building official's duty to review the plans submitted by
the architect was one that the parish had imposed on itself by adopt-
ing the building code. If personnel shortages precluded the building
official (or a competent designee) from carrying out that duty and re-
quired him to rely on the certificate of the architect or engineer, the
parish could have eliminated the requirement for an official review
.and thereby warned those concerned with the project that the cer-
tificate was the sole guarantee of the structural soundness of the
building."' Furthermore, as the Stewart opinion points out, the
breach of the duty imposed by the building code presented a signifi-
cant risk of serious personal injury to a particular class of persons,
those in and around the building during construction. Imposing
liability on the local government does not seem excessively harsh if
limited to the rather narrow circumstances. When all three of these
elements are present-a duty that the government has imposed on
itself, a threat of serious personal injury to the individuals, and con-
finement. of that threat to a discrete group of individuals-the im-
position of tort liability is unlikely to have a ruinous impact on the
governmental entity.
What is disturbing about Stewart is the court's failure to iden-
tify the factors it will consider in deciding when to impose liability
on a public official who negligently fails to perform his duty. The
court almost certainly will recognize some limits to the potentially
devastating impact of such liability,' and the court may well be us-
ing, sub silentio, a balancing test similar to the one suggested in the
preceding paragraph. But, for the present, Stewart's vagueness on
the public duty issue allows one to do no more than guess the
nature of the limits that may be recognized eventually or the type
of balancing test that may be used.
special duty to see that the construction of building was carried out safely-a special
duty in favor of those injured by accidents during construction, such as the workmen
who were injured in this case.").
144. In Stewart, the building official relied on the certification of the architect or
engineer and did not regularly review permits as the building code required him to do.
386 So. 2d at 1356. Such disparities between legal obligation and actual practice are
probably common in many local governments. In light of Stewart, attorneys represent-
ing local governments should advise their clients to review existing ordinances to
delete formal requirements that are inconsistent with current practice.
145. In past decisions, the supreme court has imposed liability for some, but not all,
damages caused in fact by the breach of the public duty to keep prisoners in-
carcerated. See, e.g., Frank v. Pitre, 353 So. 2d 1294 (La. 1977). Unfortunately, those
prisoner cases fail to provide any clear method for identifying those situations in which
liability will be imposed on the public official or public entity named as the defendant.
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